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Panel Two: Liability-Shifting the Balance of Terror
Commentary by Lucien J. Dhooge"
Thank you. Let me start by thanking the University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law for the opportunity to participate in this seminar. It is an honor to
be here.
My topic this afternoon is the issue of liability with respect to the destruction
of the World Trade Center as a result of the events of September 11, 2001. One
of the many issues arising from the events of that day is whether the attacks
constituted one or two occurrences for insurance purposes. This issue is presently
headed for resolution in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In
deciding to hear this case, the court noted that "[t]here was substantial ground for
differences of opinion as to whether the planes each represented a separate
occurrence for insurance purposes."
A short summary of the facts is in order. A group of entities assumed control
of the World Trade Center properties in July 2001 as tenants pursuant to leases
with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. These leases had ninety-
nine year terms with annual rent in excess of $107 million. The tenants'
obligations increased to $143 million when $36 million in debt service attributable to
financing associated with acquisition of the leases was included. The leases were
valued at $3.2 billion.
The tenants subsequently employed a broker to obtain insurance coverage. The
estimated replacement cost of the World Trade Center at that time was $5 billion.
The lessees ultimately obtained insurance coverage for $3.5 billion. Incredibly, the
lessees initially expressed interest in a lesser amount of insurance, but their lenders
insisted on at least $3.5 billion of coverage. The initial binder issued for the complex
defined the term "occurrence" as all losses or damages attributable directly or
indirectly to one cause or a series of similar causes. However, in e-mails exchanged
between the broker and prospective insurers in late July 2001, this definition was
allegedly deleted. In its place, the parties allegedly agreed to utilize the definition of
the term "occurrence" as it exists pursuant to applicable New York law. If true, this is
a crucial fact as New York law has some very different things to say about what
constitutes a single occurrence.
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The lack of certainty of the term "occurrence" for purposes of triggering a
claim is striking. In this case, we have lessees, financial institutions and
insurance companies involved in multi-billion dollar transactions without having
all of the pieces of the insurance puzzle in place. In any event, based upon
applicable New York law, the lessees subsequently claimed that the events of
September 1lth were two separate occurrences entitling them to $7 billion in
recovery from their insurers. This issue is currently being litigated as well as
numerous other issues arising from the attacks. In this regard, the destruction of
the World Trade Center serves as a lesson for insurance companies: whatever can
go wrong will, and has in this case.
This case also speaks to the need for certainty in the drafting of insurance
policies. Applying the initial definition set forth in the parties' agreement, it is
clear that there is one occurrence for insurance purposes. This conclusion is
based upon a number of factual similarities, specifically, departure of the flights
from the same airport in Boston, the same destination (Los Angeles) and
involvement of individuals from the same organization (Al-Qaeda) with the same
result.
However, the application of New York law results in a very different conclusion.
New York law utilizes a four-factor test to determine if there is one occurrence or
multiple occurrences for insurance purposes. The first factor is whether there was a
common origin. Specifically, the issue is whether there was a single continuous event
resulting in the loss. It may very well be contended that there is more than one single
continuous event here. After all, there were separate instrumentalities of destruction,
specifically, separate airplanes, airlines and groups of hijackers, different times at
which the hijackings occurred, and the airplanes subsequently impacted the
buildings.
The second factor is causation. There must be an unbroken causal chain resulting
in injury. The results are unclear when applying this factor to the World Trade Center.
Certainly, there were common elements before the attack, including a common
criminal conspiracy. However, the ultimate cause of the loss, the fires that weakened
the infrastructure of the buildings causing their collapse, was sparked at different times
by different airplanes seized by different groups of people. Furthermore, although the
buildings were part of a larger complex, they were geographically separate. There is
also no evidence to date suggesting that the collapse of one of the twin towers caused
the collapse of the adjoining tower.
One case of considerable significance is the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals' holding in Newmont Mines, Ltd. v. Hanover Insurance Company.' In
this case, the Second Circuit held that the collapse of separate sections of the roof
of one building occurring at separate times as the result of a common cause
(excessive snow) constituted two separate occurrences. The facts in this case are
not unlike those involving the World Trade Center, specifically, two buildings
I. Newmont Mines, Ltd. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1986).
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within the same complex collapsing at different times as a result of a common
criminal enterprise.
The third factor is the geographic relation of the properties. In order to be
deemed a single occurrence, New York law provides that the events cannot be
widely separated. Applicable case law does not define what is a "wide
separation" sufficient to render a single event multiple occurrences for insurance
purposes. Interestingly, the leading opinion on this issue comes from the New
York Court of Appeals in the 1959 case of Arthur A. Johnson Corporation v.
Indemnity Insurance Company In that case, the sub-basements of two adjoining
buildings flooded as a result of the breach of temporary walls erected during
construction. The buildings flooded at separate times, albeit, as a result of the same
cause, specifically, the failure of the temporary walls to restrain water. Despite their
proximity, the sharing of a common wall and the instrumentality common in their
damage, the court held that the buildings were geographically separate. If one
applies this reasoning to the World Trade Center, it is difficult to conclude that
they are geographically inseparable, thus rendering their destruction a single
occurrence.
The final factor is the temporal relationship of the losses. Specifically, losses
widely separated in time are separate occurrences for insurance purposes. As in
the case of geographic relation, there is no clear judicial definition of what
constitutes a wide separation in time. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Company v. Wesolowski,3 decided in 1973, the New York Court of Appeals held
that multiple losses occurring within seconds of one another in an automobile
accident arise from a single occurrence. On the other end of the spectrum, in
Stonewall Insurance Company v. Asbestos Claims Management Corporation,4
decided in 1995, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that multiple exposures to
asbestos occurring over a fifty-one year period are temporally separate as to
constitute multiple occurrences. These holdings are not of much guidance. A fifty-
one year period of time is chronologically distinct as to constitute two separate
occurrences, but events within seconds of one another constitute a single
occurrence. So where does the World Trade Center case fit?
The answer may lie in the Johnson case. In Johnson, the collapses of the
walls that ultimately caused the flooding of the adjoining buildings occurred fifty
minutes apart. The court found this temporal separation sufficient to constitute
two separate occurrences. The result still remains unclear applying this reasoning
to the World Trade Center. The strikes upon the towers were separated by
twenty-one minutes. Their ultimate collapses occurred twenty-nine minutes
apart. Despite this uncertainty, I would submit that a distinction between fifty
minutes constituting two occurrences and twenty-one or twenty-nine minutes
2. Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Indem. Ins. Co., 164 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1959).
3. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d 907 (N.Y. 1973).
4. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995).
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constituting one occurrence is legal hairsplitting. I remain unconvinced that the
resolution of a $3.5 billion question should turn on the basis of a twenty minute
difference in time, especially given the application of the three previous factors.
Finally, there is a presumption in insurance cases favoring one occurrence in
mass tort cases. This presumption serves to maximize recovery by adding claims
together in order to quickly reach the level of any applicable deductible. A
finding of multiple occurrences makes such a result more difficult as each
individual claim would be required to meet the deductible in order to be payable.
However, this presumption does not serve to maximize recovery for the lessees
in the World Trade Center case. Rather, concluding that there were two separate
occurrences maximizes recovery. This approach increases the lessees' total
recovery from $3.5 billion to $7 billion. Given that the parties apparently did not
answer these difficult issues for themselves, it remains to be seen what remedy
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit will craft for them. Thank you.
